» » Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Oxford Moral Theory)

Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Oxford Moral Theory) download epub

by Douglas W. Portmore


Epub Book: 1523 kb. | Fb2 Book: 1162 kb.

Abstract Douglas Portmore’s recent book, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Rationality Meets Morality, is an ambitious, painstaking effort to render the moral requirements of conse­ quentialism consistent both with our intuitions and with the requirements o. .

Abstract Douglas Portmore’s recent book, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Rationality Meets Morality, is an ambitious, painstaking effort to render the moral requirements of conse­ quentialism consistent both with our intuitions and with the requirements of rationality. Portmore argues for a version of consequentialism that requires one to act in accordance with one’s reasons for preference or reasons for desire.

Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the . Oxford University Press, USA, 2 нояб

Oxford University Press, USA, 2 нояб.

Both the debates within consequentialism and those between consequentialists and their critics are advanced, and Portmore . Douglas W. Portmore is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University

Both the debates within consequentialism and those between consequentialists and their critics are advanced, and Portmore provides the reader with a wealth of new philosophical tools to advance them still further. This is a really great book: an encompassing work of systematizing moral philosophy in the classic style. Portmore is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University.

Douglas . ortmore, Commonsense Consequentialism . ortmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. xx + 266. - Volume 24 Issue 4 - JEAN-PAUL VESSEL. First, overviews are provided of consequentialist theories and of the rule-worship or incoherence objection to t theories. Then a summary is offered of the considerable textual evidence.

Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialism Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options. Portmore - 2012 - Noûs 46 (1):24 - 6. etails.

Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialism. Attila Tanyi - 2015 - In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (ed., Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. However, there is at least one moral theory – consequentialism – that is said to be beset by this demandingness problem. Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options. Agents often face a choice of what to do.

Portmore Douglas W. (EN)

Portmore Douglas W. (EN).

Douglas Portmore's argument in Commonsense Consequentialism can profitably be understood as unfolding in.

Douglas Portmore's argument in Commonsense Consequentialism can profitably be understood as unfolding in two main stages. He argues in the first stage (chapters 1-3) that a modest form of moral rationalism sets plausibility constraints on acceptable moral theories, and that traditional forms of make demands that violate such constraints. Portmore's answer is to argue that any plausible moral theory will be a form of, hence that any plausible explanation of deontic verdicts will have a consequentialist form. Central steps in his argument can be highlighted by returning to his journey to the heart of consequentialism.

Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. Commonsense Consequentialism. Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. Develops a new kind of consequentialist moral theory, one that ranks outcomes, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the relevant agent has to desire that each outcome obtains.

Commonsense Consequentialism book. Start by marking Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read.

Douglas W. Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. JEAN-PAUL VESSEL (a1).

Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons. Broadly construed, consequentialism is the view that an act's deontic status is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. Portmore argues that outcomes should be ranked, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the relevant agent has to desire that each outcome obtains and that, when outcomes are ranked in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many forms of deontology can. What's more, Portmore argues that we should accept this version of consequentialism, because we should accept both that an agent can be morally required to do only what she has most reason to do and that what she has most reason to do is to perform the act that would produce the outcome that she has most reason to want to obtain.Although the primary aim of the book is to defend a particular moral theory (viz., commonsense consequentialism), Portmore defends this theory as part of a coherent whole concerning our commonsense views about the nature and substance of both morality and rationality. Thus, it will be of interest not only to those working on consequentialism and other areas of normative ethics, but also to those working in metaethics. Beyond offering an account of morality, Portmore offers accounts of practical reasons, practical rationality, and the objective/subjective obligation distinction.
Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Oxford Moral Theory) download epub
Humanities
Author: Douglas W. Portmore
ISBN: 0199794537
Category: Other
Subcategory: Humanities
Language: English
Publisher: Oxford University Press; 1 edition (November 2, 2011)
Pages: 288 pages