D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion (Praeger Security International) download epub

by Mary K. Barbier

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Similar books to D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion (Praeger Security International). Kindle (5th Generation). Mary Kathryn Barbier is a professor of history at Mississippi State University, where she teaches American history, military history, and grand strategy. She is also the author of Kursk (978-0-7603-1254-4) and coauthor of Strategy and Tactics (978-0-7603-1401-2).

D-Day Deception book. Start by marking D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion (Praeger Security International) as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read. On 6 June 1944, Allied forces stormed the beaches at Normandy.

D-day deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy invasion. Download (pdf, . 0 Mb) Donate Read. Epub FB2 mobi txt RTF. Converted file can differ from the original. If possible, download the file in its original format. Westport and London: Praeger Security International. Barbier, Mary Kathryn (2007b). Deception and the Planning of D-Day". ISBN 978-0-275-99479-2. In Buckley, John (e. The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-44942-7.

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Mary Kathryn Barbier, American history professor. Member of Society Military History.

Mary Kathryn Barbier, American history professor. While historians have generally praised Operation Fortitude, Barbier takes a more nuanced view, arguing that the deception, while implemented well, affected the invasion's outcome only minimally. 35346/?tag prabook0b-20.

Barbier, M. (2007) D-day deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy invasion. Praeger Security International, Westport, C. oogle Scholar. Bodmer, . M. Kilger, G. Carpenter, and J. Jones (2012) Reverse Deception: Organized Cyber Threat. McGraw-Hill: New York. Cite this chapter as: Heckman . Schmoker . Tsow . 2015) Intrusions, Deception, and Campaigns. In: Cyber Denial, Deception and Counter Deception. Advances in Information Security.

On 6 June 1944, Allied forces stormed the beaches at Normandy. The invasion followed several years of argument and planning by Allied leaders, who remained committed to a return to the European continent after the Germans had forced the Allies to evacuate at Dunkirk in May 1940. Before the spring of 1944, however, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and other British leaders remained unconvinced that the invasion was feasible. At the Teheran Conference in November 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill promised Josef Stalin that Allied troops would launch Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy, in the spring. Because of their continuing concerns about Overlord, the British convinced the Americans to implement a cover plan to help ensure the invasion's success. The London Controlling Section (LCS) devised an elaborate two-part plan called Operation Fortitude that SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) helped to fine tune and that both British and American forces implemented

Historians analyzing the Normandy invasion frequently devote some discussion to Operation Fortitude. Although they admit that Fortitude North did not accomplish all that the Allied deception planners had hoped, many historians heap praise on Fortitude South, using phrases such as, unquestionably the greatest deception in military history. Many of these historians assume that the deception plan played a crucial role in the June 1944 assault. A reexamination of the sources suggests, however, that other factors contributed as much, if not more, to the Allied victory in Normandy and that Allied forces could have succeeded without the elaborate deception created by the LCS. Moreover, the persistent tendency to exaggerate the operational effect of Fortitude on the German military performance at Normandy continues to draw attention away from other, technical-military reasons for the German failures there.

Comments: (7)

Manemanu

The author is a poor writer. The book has a lot of good information but the arguments that she crafts are unbelievably unclear and confusing. This has much more to do with her poor writing than the presumably well-researched and well thought-out ideas in her head. She throws in so many "however"s, "in fact"s, and "nevertheless" (etc.) in completely inappropriate locations which serve to completely muddle the idea she is trying to get across. For instance, she will write paragraphs with a structure that resembles this: "A=B. However, A in fact...=B." She often uses a tone which makes it seem like her research contradicts the prior historical consensus which she states at the beginning of the paragraph. But then she goes on to say: "However, in reality... (followed by the exact same idea she stated at the beginning of the paragraph)." She communicates with literary tones in so many of her paragraphs that completely contradict what presumably is the main idea of those paragraphs. After getting through them, I often have no idea whether her opinion is in agreement with what "so-and-so" said or not.

FireWater

While I agree with a previous reviewer that this book is possibly just a rehash of a PhD dissertation, a common practice; I fail to see how, if that is the case, it ever passed a dissertation review committee. It is missing the key element that would test the validity of its premise that this operation was instrumental in the D-Day success-that of research in German military archives.

If I were trying to determine whether a military operation of deception was successful I would ask the recipients of the deception, not the deceivers. It's impossible to judge the depth of the pro and con of this argument without an equal approach to well documented history.

I am bewildered, and do not accept Ms Barbier's explanation that she can't read German. There are translated documents available.

Domarivip

I happen to know more than the average person about decpetion in WW2, and have read through the entire FORTITUDE plans. I can say that decption is a difficult subject to tackle due to the classifications and unavailability of information. That is not the problem here.

However, this book shows serious flaws about some basic miolitary natters, as well as well readily available decption material. First, I am totally stunned that every illustration int he book is of one of the American inflatible vehicle decoys which played no part what so ever in FORTITUDE. The only decoys utilized were landing craft and aircraft.

The book is heavily skewed to the British side of thgins (to be fair they did run most of it), but the role of the American 23rd Special Troops is totally incorrect, and the Senior American Decption Officer (Col. Billy Harris) is mentioned once when he is apointed and then forgotten. This is topped off by much about the British troops building the decoy landing craft, but not one mention of the American 602nd Engineers who were awarded a unit cittation for the speed and quality of their work.

There are some minor issues that might be chalked up to editorial problems General Crow instead of Grow, and Rhine ferries instead of rhino ferries, but when the German 91st Air-landing Division is called a luftwaffe unit it shows there is a problem.

One of the main theories put forth as to why the Germans did not reinfoce Normandy was there were no decent transportation routes left after allied bombing. Interesting theory, however previously we are shown how no units were to be moved without Hitler's direct permission, and he was not known for worrying about such matters. If he wanted a unit moved it was ordered to be moved.

I just cannot help but feel the author, who seems to have tried, just does not have the period military backlground to get involved with such a complcated subject.

Jaiarton

This is a comprehensive review of the D-Day FORTITUDE deception plans, their execution and the German reaction to them. It is written in the style and language of a Phd dissertation. As to the Allied view of FORTITUDE, the book adds little to that provided in Hesketch's FORTITUDE and Brown's BODYGUARD of LIES. It's main contribution is to summarize the German reaction to the deceptions. The author also concludes the deceptions were not a large contributor to Allied D-Day success, a conclusion different from many of the Allied participants and commanders. Also, the book uses very small type which is difficult to read.

D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion (Praeger Security International) download epub

Humanities

Author: Mary K. Barbier
ISBN: 0275994791
Category: Other
Subcategory: Humanities
Language: English
Publisher: Praeger (October 30, 2007)
Pages: 280 pages

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